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CASES NOTED
states which follow the Uniform Sales Act, 7 such as New York, the language
that

"...

the buyer relies on the seller's skill or judgment...-

"

is held to

apply to the serving of food by a victualer in the same way that it applies to a
manufacturer or retailer. The transaction is therefore a sale.8
Those jurisdictions following the more modern view of the Sales Act
hold the victualer absolutely liable on the theory of implied warranty. 9 This
view is derived from the English Common Law as expounded by Blackstone:
"... in contracts for provisions it is always implied that they are wholesome, and
if they be not, the same remedy [damage for deceit] may be had." "0 The
modern implied warranty doctrine is based on two theories. First. tinder
modern conditions, service of food in a restaurant is a sale, in which the food
is impliedly warranted to be pure. 1 The other theory is that public policy
requires food served to the public to be fit for human consumption.' 2
In Florida the. manufacturer and packer of tinned meat products is held
absolutely liable on the implied warranty doctrine.'1 This doctrine has also
been applied in the retail sale of poisonous lipstick.' 4 In the instant case the
court draws an analogy between a manufacturer of tinned meat products and
a victualer who manufactures food for human consumption. The victualer
should be held to the same implied warranty as the manufacturer. 16 This
holding, which is in accord with the more modern view, although placing a
greater burden on the victualer, affords the consumer added protection.

TAXATION-PERMISSIBILITY OF'COUNTERCLAIM
FORECLOSURE SUIT

IN TAX

The City of Pensacola filed its bill of complaint to foreclose tax liens for
delinquent taxes against lands owned by a private corporation. A counterclaim
was filed by the corporation in which it prayed that the city be temporarily and
permanently enjoined from operating a storm sewer that was discharging
refuse on the lands described in the tax foreclosure action, and that an account
of damages sustained by the corporation be taken. This counterclaim was
struck on motion of the city. Later, the corporation filed a separate bill of complaint' setting forth substantially the same allkgations. From the order dismissing this bill on motion of the city and from the order striking the counter7. UNIFORM SALES Acr § 15.
Keeler, 238 N. Y. 344, 144 N. E. 635 (1924).
9. Friend v. Childs Dining Hall Co., 231 Mass. 65, 120 N. E. 407 (1918); Tealtve v.
Keeler, supra.
10. I WILLISTON, SALES § 241 (Rev. ed. 1948).
11. Stanfield v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 143 Kan. 117. 53 P.2d 378 (1936).
12. Race v. Krum, 222 N. Y. 410, 118 N. E. 853 (1918).
13. Blanton v. Cudahy Packing Co., 154 Fla. 872, 19 So.2d 313 (1944).
14. Smith v. Burdine's, Inc., 144 Fla. 500, 198 So. 223 (1940).
15. Accord, Cushing v. Rodman, 82 F2d 864 (App. D. C. 1936). Contra: Nisky v.
Childs, supra.

8. Temple v.

MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
claim, the corporation. brought certiorari. Held, certiorari granted and order
dismissing the bill of complaint quashed. The corporation's bill set out a cause
of action since a municipality is not able to set in motion an agency which continually destroys one's property and at the same time insist on the payment of
taxes thereon. While the court discussed the counterclaim, no order was made
as to its disposition. Baylen Street Wharf Co. v. City of Pensacola, 39 So.2d
66 (1949).
Notwithstanding its terse holding, the opinion sets the stage for the abnegation of the firmly established doctrine in Florida that claims against a
municipality can not be pleaded by way of set-off or counterclaim in actions
to enforce collections of taxes due the municipality. This rule was adopted as
early as 1875 on the grounds that equity courts can not assume municipal discretion by administering its general revenues, and that a tax, being a governmental impost not arising out of contract, is not the subject matter of set-off.
This principle is supported by later cases in Florida 2 and in a majority of
other jurisdictions,8 its most stringent application being found in St. Lucie
Estates T'. Ashley I where it was held that under no circumstances, would an
exception, other than a statutory one, be allowed."
In some jurisdictions, however, set-offs have been permitted in special
circtimstances.6 Set-off has also been acknowledged as a defense to tax collection proceedings either where the court, invoking simple contract principles,
has justified the allowance of a tax exemption as a matter of compensation due
the taxpayer for services rendered, 7 or in rcognition of a mistake arising from
excessive payment of previous taxes.8 All of the cases, except one, 9 allowing
set-offs aglainst taxes involve public or quasi-public utility companies rendering a continuing service to the municipality. No reason is given by the court in

I. Finnegan v. Ferinandina, 15 Fla. 379, 21 Am. Rep. 292 (1875); accord, Lane
Couty v. Oregon, 7 %Val[. 80 (U. S. 1868) ; Re Sezward, 5 Alaska 726 (1917) ; Johnson
v. Howard. 41 \Vt. 122, 98 Am. Dec. 568 (1868).
2. Aikens v. City of Rockledge, 132 Fla. 874, 182 So. 235 (1938) ; St. Lucie Estates,
Inc. v. Ashley, 105 Fla. 534, 141 So. 738 (1932).
3. Charlotte v. Keon, 207 N. Y. 346, 100 N. F. 1116 (1913); City of Richmond v:
Virginia Ry. & Power Co., 124 Va. 529, 98 S. E. 691 (1919).
4. Supra.
5. Accord, Tarver v. Dalton, 134 Ga. 462, 67 S. E. 929 (1910); Anderson v. Mayfield, 93 Ky. 230, 19 S. W. 598 (1892); FLA. STAr. § 52.11(4) (1941)
(set-offs against
any subdivisioni of the state shall not be Cxt..lIL-d "ICytind the limits 11roW
fixed by law").
6. Amy v. Shelby County Taxing I)i.trict. 114 U. S. 387 (1885) (claim by tax
debtor who purchased debts of the city payable in taxes) ; loiuisville V. McAteer, 26
Ky. L. Rep. 425, 81 S. W. 698 (1904) (claim by water eumliahy in which city was largest
stockholder) ; Louisville & N, Ry. v. Cominoaiwealth. 17 Ky. I.. Rep. 136, 30 S. W. 624
(1895) (claim by railroad ol ground that equily must do comlete justice) ; taton Rapids
v. Houpt, 63 Mich. 371, 29 N. W. 860 (1886) (special fund existed to meet the claim)Georges Twp. v. Union Trust Co., 293 Pa. 364, 143 Ad. 10 (1928) (claim by a bank).
7. Maine Water Co. v. City of Watervillh. 93 Me. 586,45 Ad. 830 (1900) ; Montclair
Water Co. v. Town of Montclair. 81 N. J. 1. 573, 79 Ati. 258 (1911) ; phillips v. City
of Portsmouth, 115 Va. 180, 78 S. E. 651 (1913).
8. Louisville & N. Ry. v.Commonwealth. supra.
9. Amy v. Shelby County Taxing District. supra.

CASES NOTED
any of these cases for making an exception to the rule and the exceptions are
apparently without foundation.
In the instant case the antinomy existing between the necessity for respecting individual rights and the unhindered execution of a governmental
tax program is recognized. The matter is, admittedly, not easily resolved, but
the court's disposition of the problem, by reinstating the bill of complaint in
the second action is clear and definite. Not so, however, with reference to the
issue of the counterclaim. Here, the court recognized the general rule disallowing counterclaims to tax suits but opines that it may have its exceptions:
that circumstances may give rise to new precedents; that the allegations of the
counterclaim, if proven, are sufficient to give the corporation relief; that in
their holding they do not mean to displace the general rule, but that a municipality cannot destroy one's property and at the samd time insist on payment
of taxes thereon. Alternatives in lieu of counterclaim, as in State Road Department v. Tharp,'0 are suggested, but none are directed. The significance
of the statement by the court that the allegations in the counterclaim and bill
of complaint are "not materially different" is left to conjecture. Accordingly,
it is difficult to perceive the precise point which tile court was attempting to
nmake with reference to counterclaims or set-offs in tax foreclosure actions.
The language creates more than an inference that the court is amenable
to exceptions to the counterclaim in tax foreclosures. It presents a possible
line of attack which, if successfully developed, threatens to cripple the enforcement of tax collections.

TAXATION-STREET ASSESSMENTS-NECESSITY
ABUTTING PROPERTY BE BENEFITED

THAT

The City of Miami Beach imposed assessments against abutting property
owners to pay for the paving of a street within the city. The property owners
filed a bill of complaint to invalidate the assessments, alleging. in substance,
that the improvements were of no benefit to the abutting land since this
particular section within the city was a quiet residential area, and that the
street improvement would decrease the value of the abutting land by making
the street a noisy, heavily-traveled thoroughfare. The lower court dismissed
the plaintiff's bill. Held, on appeal, decree reversed. Rajkin v. City of Miami
Beach, 38 So.2d 836 (Fla. 1949).
This decision will undoubtedly bring about a decrease in local strect
improvements in residential areas. It has been held in Florida that local
improvements result from a public demand for additional conveniences, and
10. 146 Fla. 745, 1 So.2d 868 (1941).

